I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and Soviet Union led the way in conquering space in the 1950s through a series of initiatives that included satellites, launch of spacecrafts and nuclear detonations. In October 1957, man conquered space with the launch of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union. In the same year, the United States successfully undertook nuclear detonations in space. 5 Four years later, the Soviet Union launched the first manned spaceflight when it placed Yuri Gagarin into orbit. The United States followed suit in 1962. These activities effectively marked the start of a technological race between the United States and Soviet Union with each seeking dominance in space exploration marking the genesis of a space race which would soon metamorphose into an arms race. As the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union grew in intensity, the military utility space offered was not lost on the sea-faring nations. development of state-of-the-art technology to capitalize on the utility of outer space got underway.
The international community was quick to generate rhetoric that states should use outer space for positive and peaceful purposes. A 1957 General Assembly resolution dealing with the topic of disarmament declared that "the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes." 6 A year later, U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 1348 recognized that the common aim of humankind was that outer space was to be used "for peaceful purposes only." 7 The United States and Soviet Union obliged with the United
States adopting the view that:
" [P] eaceful" in relation to outer space activities was interpreted…to mean "non-aggressive" rather than non-military…By contrast, the Soviet Union publicly took the view, despite its own military uses of space, that "peaceful" meant "non-military" and that in consequence all military activities in outer space were "non-peaceful" and possibly illegal. This divided sentiments by the two superpowers, the vanguard in the development of customary law on the matter, meant that despite general international sentiment championing nonmilitarization of space, the looming space arms race on the horizon had powerful "patrons".
The mastery of outer space as the basis of integrated battleground platforms is fast becoming a reality. As the two Gulf Wars and the Kosovo military campaign made clear, space assets are decisive in battle planning and execution. As the 21st century unfolds, several decades after man's conquest of space, the increasing global reliance on space systems and an increasing militarization of space and its weaponization, its evolution into a distinct theatre of military 6 G.A.Res. 1148 (XII), 12 U.N.GAOR Supp. No. 10-18 (1956-57 operations is a matter of time. The worrying thing from the author's perspective is that when the reality of space warfare dawns, there will be a serious legal deficit in the absence of specific international norms restricting the use of means and methods of war in space. State practice as it currently exists offers no insights into how the law will be applied. Space law is patchy with regard to militarization and weaponization of space. On one hand the provisions of its key instruments offer broad interpretational leeway for and against the militarization and weaponization of space, while on the other hand, cyber warfare itself sits uneasily within the U.N. Charter on the regime on the use of force in light of the Charter drafters' almost singular fixation on conventional land, air and sea warfare.
This article seeks to bring to light the various aspects pertaining to the militarization and weaponization of space. 9 It will give an overview of initiatives by the space-faring nations in developing space weaponry, discuss the space law regime and in particular expose its defects in effectively addressing space warfare. It will then proceed to generally juxtapose space warfare with the U.N. Charter regime on the use of force. The article exposes various questions, but does not seek to undertake the ambitious goal of supplying solutions; after all, as the article will demonstrate, the problems are readily evident, but the solutions absent.
II. DEVELOPING COMBAT CAPABILITIES IN SPACE: FROM SCIENCE FICTION TO MILITARY UTILITY
Despite the various prohibitions spelt out in declarations, proclamations and treaties, the United States and Soviet Union actively sought to harness the military capabilities offered by the 9 The term "militarization," as applied to outer space, should not be confused with "weaponization." Though there are no authoritative international definitions of either term, the former refers to "the use of outer space by a significant number of military spacecraft" while the latter "refers to the placing in outer space for any length of time any device designed to attack man-made targets in outer space and/or in the terrestrial environment." Ivan A. In 1981, the first year of the Reagan presidency, the new administration initiated a comprehensive space policy review geared towards exploring ways of generating a United States military capacity to weaponize space. Amidst the review, the Soviet Union introduced the prevention of an arms race in outer space into the agenda of the thirty-sixth General Assembly in the fall of 1981. 18 The Soviets proposed the conclusion of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space. 19 The General Assembly was receptive to the Soviet initiative and expressed the view that it "considered it necessary to take effective steps, by concluding an appropriate international treaty, to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space." 20 However, the initiative was received a lukewarm approach and was soon dead without mourners or honor. States cast the single negative vote." 35 The prevention of an arms race in outer space was once again at the heart of the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament composed of both developed and developing world countries when it convened for its 520th plenary meeting in 1989. Delegates called for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The general sentiments of the meeting are captured in Indian Ambassador Sharma's declaration that:
[I]t is accepted that an extension of the arms race into outer space would have profoundly destabilizing consequences. Deeply conscious of such risks, an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations have in recent years urged the Conference on Disarmament to take resolute measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. 
III. THE FIRST GULF WAR: "DWARFING" THE ENEMY THROUGH SPACE

SUPREMACY
The first Gulf War ("Operation Desert Storm") heralded the beginning of a great era of the space age.
37 "It's the first space war," declared a space policy analyst. 38 Coalition forces, which included the largest naval fleet constituted since World War II, were supported by "the most sophisticated information network ever designed…dwarfing anything generated in previous wars." 39 An impressive array of technologies, and particularly the use of satellites and other outer-space mounted devices, was on display. The United States displayed that space technology would be harnessed to coordinate land, sea and aerial military assets to produce a holistic integrated battle platform. The "Smart War" featured lightening attacks targeting Iraqi command and control targets, 40 and "microwave" technology targeting and jamming Iraqi communications facilities. 41 The future was now here. vulnerable to attack from adversaries. 48 The report went on to caution that the United States must anticipate a "Space Pearl Harbor"-a crippling sneak attack against American satellites orbiting the planet. 49 To reduce the nation's vulnerability, the Rumsfeld Commission urged the government to develop "superior space capabilities," including the ability to "negate the hostile use of space against United States interests" by using "power projection in, from and through space." 50 With the Bush Jr. administration pledging to pursue a national missile defense system, Rumsfeld's vision was to guarantee dominance of space by eliminating threats to America's satellites. 51 Rumsfeld noted that from history every medium-air, land and sea-had seen conflict. In essence, contemporary reality indicates that space will be no different. 52 The report from his Commission rounded off by calling space warfare "a virtual certainty."
It was not just the Americans who were seeing space warfare as a virtual certainty in the future. The first Gulf War had convinced China's military leadership of the importance of hightech warfare and the ability of sophisticated space-based command, control, communications, and intelligence systems to link land, sea and air forces. 53 The growing importance of space in future warfare left the Chinese with no choice but to take note of United States military efforts to ensure future space dominance. With Russia a washed out power lacking the financial resources to keep up the "toe to toe" space arms race with the United States, China as an aspiring superpower has been quick to join the game. 
IV. CHINA-A NEW CHALLENGER STEPS FORWARD: THE DRAGON LOOKS UP TO THE HEAVENS
Having watched the United States harness the effectiveness of an integrated battleground platform underpinned by space technology and weaponry in the first Gulf War, Chinese defense analysts recognized that space control provides the key to military victories in modern warfare.
As a consequence, China has in recent years been concentrating on sharpening its military power through incorporation of technology geared toward a leaner and efficient technologically driven military. This is in part due to five factors.
1. the technical and professional reforms of the 1980s which sought to de-politicize the military allowing it to focus more robustly on its core business-effective warfare capability. 4. the Bush Jr. administration's push to implement a national ballistic missile shield and significantly the potential provision of this technology to Taiwan in an atmosphere of increased tension between the tiny island state and mainland China. 5. its aspirations to superpower status, helped in no small measure by the vacuum created by the break-up of the Soviet Union, its chaotic and inept transition to free market economy that has hamstrung it economically resulting in a significant decay of its military capabilities. 
IV. A NEW CALCULUS-SPACE LAW: MANAGING AN EXTRA-TERRESTIAL WILD WEST
In the late 1950s, states maintained the view that outer space should be used for "peaceful" purposes. However, the disagreement was whether this meant "non-military" or "nonaggressive uses," especially considering the fact that the then-dominant players-the two superpowers-were actively engaged in harnessing the military utility offered by space and were thus averse to a strict definition. The space regime as it now exists rests upon five United Nations treaties on outer space. These treaties evolved from a series of General Assembly resolutions and declarations following the creation of the Outer Space Committee in 1959. 69 The development of a legal regime to govern space was kick-started in 1963 with the adoption of the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing State Activity in the Exploration and Use of Outer in late 1963 by the United Nations General Assembly. 70 It was the "first significant step in the development of space law". 71 In the same year that the Declaration on Legal Principles was adopted, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty) 72 entered into force to address the contested and controversial issue of nuclear detonations in space. The treaty primarily aimed to limit nuclear weapons testing but was also a reaction to Soviet pleas that nuclear detonations posed a danger to the safety of its cosmonauts. 73 Though the United States responded to the Soviet concern with the assurance "that no activities were contemplated which could have harmful effects upon the Soviet spacemen," 74 the international community nonetheless felt it imperative that nuclear detonations be totally banned. With the entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, nuclear detonations in space were no longer lawful. 75 In addition, the treaty establishes three significant implications for space warfare. These are eloquently synthesized by Major Robert A. Ramsey:
The treaty's singular focus on nuclear detonations was a sign of its time. Little thought and attention seems to have been put into ensuring that the treaty effectively prevented space from being turned from a sanctuary of "peaceful" science into a battleground that may one day offer opportunities for offensive and defensive non-nuclear weapons. First, the ban focuses exclusively on nuclear weapons, meaning that other forms of weapons such as conventional, biological, chemical, or high energy laser weapons can be deployed without breaching the treaty.
Second, to the extent that nuclear power sources operate by means other than explosion, the treaty does not prohibit their use. This off course means that the testing and deployment of non- apply to land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. 86 Evidence that the drafters only intended Article IV (1) to ban orbiting nuclear-type weapons is the drafters' agreement that the Treaty does not prohibit the stationing of land-based ICBMs, even though their flight trajectory would take them through outer space. 87 It is well established that the only specific limitation placed on the use of the outer void space for military purposes is that found in Article IV (1) . 88 Professor
Cheng asserts that "the outer void space as such can be used for any military activity that is compatible with general international law and the Charter of the United Nations, so long as no "nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction are stationed there." 89 The practical import of this analysis is captured in Anderson's observation that:
Under this…interpretation, none of the exotic future weapons systems currently being proposed or researched by the United States would violate this provision of the Outer Space Treaty. For instance, laser beam weapons are intended to destroy their targets by delivering a high impulse shock that causes structural collapse of the rocket booster or by remaining on the target until a hole is burned through the missile… violations would only occur if any of the weapon systems included a nuclear explosion to propel them or as a means of destroying a target.
90
Alongside the specific reference the restriction of only particular weapons, Article IV is the setting for much greater controversy. It provides for two separate legal regimes for military activity in outer space: (1) activity conducted on the moon and other celestial bodies, and (2) activity conducted in outer space itself. Article IV divides the extraterrestrial universe into three parts: the Earth's orbit, celestial bodies, and outer space. This then means that the Outer Space Treaty does not completely free all of outer space from military use. Military activity by its 86 According to one report, the "common definition" of "weapons of mass destruction" is nuclear bombs or warheads. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1983, at A1, col. 6; See also Captain Michael G. The article now turns to juxtapose weaponization of outer space and the U.N. Charter regime on the use of force. The snapshot offered demonstrates the legal and interpretation muddle that confronts the international community with interpretations possible both ways depending on the interpreter demonstrating a lack of clarity or perhaps internal contradictions in the space law regime. As will be seen, just like the space law regime, the application of the U.N. Charter provisions on the use of force create plenty of middle ground when confronted with the weaponization of space.
IV. SPACE AND THE UN CHARTER: PEELING A LEGAL ONION?
When the U.N. Charter was drafted in 1945, the right of self-defense was the only included exception (reserved to state discretion) to the general prohibition of the use of force.
Previously, in addition to self-defense, customary international law had accepted reprisal, retaliation, and retribution as legitimate responses by states whose interests had been injured.
Under the U.N. Charter, unilateral acts of force were not characterized as self-defense, regardless 102 Id. The reality noted in part II of the article is that despite the space regime being premised on the basic principle of "peaceful" purposes which at first glance seems to militate against any Considering that the legal regime on the use of force and the law of war are products of international law, the logical presumption is that it encompasses the pacific theme that lies at the heart of the U.N. Charter. This is especially so in view of the fact that article III makes specific reference to the U.N. Charter. This being so, the argument advanced above regarding the tacit application of the provision to space warfare would not hold much water. However, though the application of international law to outer space is hemmed in by a pacific theme championing the interest of maintaining international peace and security, the elastic space regime affords interpretation one way or the other. This is insofar as a cyber-attack on a State's commercial satellites is commensurate with the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty of another State (or perhaps, more specifically, with the use of weapons by a State against the territory of another State) . . . and not justified as either self-defense or collective security. 112 The crux of the matter, though, is that the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit the transiting, or even the orbiting, of conventional weaponry in space. As Ramsey notes:
The prohibition on orbiting of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, strongly suggests the distinction between those weapons, and conventional weapons of lesser destructive power, including those directed at satellites. Though Article IV (1) could easily be modified to effect the de-weaponization of space, conventional weapons are not proscribed. While there is little controversy that "peaceful purposes" applies to outer space activities controversy comes into play as to what the phrase means. General consensus within the United Nations points to an understanding of "peaceful", as more specifically equating to "nonaggressive". As noted by Qian Jiadong of China during the 1986 Conference on Disarmament:
"Outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of ... mankind. No country should develop, test or deploy space weapons in any form. An international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons should be concluded through negotiations as soon as possible." 117 However, controversy arises owing to two divergent views strongly propounded by the two leading space faring nations and thus the vanguard of the development of customary international law on the matter-the U.S. and Soviet Union (now Russia, the rump republic of the former Soviet Union). The original Soviet view was that "peaceful purposes" meant no "military" use of outer space, a view that they later softened 118 as their military satellite programs came to fruition. 119 The Soviets have always claimed that their uses of outer space were "peaceful" and "scientific". 120 The U.S. view has always been 121 that the phrase "peaceful purposes" means "non-aggressive" use of outer space, a view it has adhered to from the beginning of the space age. 122 Thus, the 1958 U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Act (the statutory basis for the U. S.
national space program) 123 requires that U.S. space activities be devoted to "peaceful purposes",
The basis for a "non-military" definition is further championed by Professor Bin Cheng.
He draws a tight, cogent analogy between the "peaceful purpose" clause in the Outer Space itself merely to the examination of issues relevant to disarmament, we would replace the Tower of Babel as the symbol of confused confabulation. Our discussions here must not only be graduated but must also have a sense of direction…" 137 In the coming couple of decades, space warfare may well be a reality; this requires the formulation of a new perspective on the law of war. There is need for either an entirely international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons or at least the conclusion of a protocol to the outer Space treaty to this effect.
138
This will eliminate the need for academicians and practitioners to making educated but uncertain guesses based on analogies with other legal regimes. 139 The need for clear, coherent legal limitations in space is summed up by Colleen D.
Sullivan's astute observation that despite the fact that customary law, which has evolved in the last few decades since human-created objects began orbiting the earth and is based on principles designed to keep weapons out of space, the international community must codify them in treaties to assure that weapons remain out of the space environment. 140 The author concurs enthusiastically with this observation. After all, this has been the general intent of the international community, evidenced by countless statements, numerous declarations and resolutions and the general tenor of the space law regime.
